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Crowe: Crowe: Insufficient Funds Checks

Comments
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS CHECKS IN THE CRIMINAL AREA:
ELEMENTS, ISSUES, AND PROPOSALS
I.

INTRODUCION

Few individuals in American society could operate their financial
affairs without a checking account. A check can usually mean instant money.
In fact, the process's ease of operation makes it susceptible to abuse. While
only a small percentage of the checks passed every year can be termed

"bad"-i.e., forged, no-account, no-funds, or insufficient funds-over 80
percent of all bad checks fall in the category of insufficient funds.1 The
purpose of this comment is to make an in-depth study of how American
jurisdictions treat the crime of passing insufficient funds checks (hereinafter "bad" checks will be limited to insufficient funds checks) and to
make proposals aimed at treating the bad check writer and his victim
more justly while at the same time protecting the system of commercial
paper. The question whether issuing insufficient funds checks should be

a criminal offense at all when there is a civil remedy is beyond the scope
of this comment.
II. THE NATURE OF INSUFFICIENT FUNDS STATUTES
A. Language,Elements, and Issues
There were no insufficient funds crimes at common law, because
the offense of false pretenses covered the same acts. The basic elements
of false pretenses are: (1) The false representation of a material past or
present fact, (2) made by the accused with knowledge of its falsity, (8)
with intent to defraud, (4) which causes the victim, (5) to pass title to,
(6) his property to the wrongdoer.2 Although the offense of false pretenses
covers more criminal acts than the typical insufficient funds statute,8 a
comparison of the elements of the two offenses reveals several similarities.
1.

F. BEUTEL, SOME POTENTIALMrrEs OF EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AS A
OF SocIAL ScmNcE 258-59 (1957).
W. LAFAvE &A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 655 (1972).

Nmv BmaNic

2.
3. Section 561.460, RSMo 1969, states:
Any person who, to procure any article or thing of value or for the
payment of any past due debt or other obligation of whatsoever form or
nature or who, for any other purpose, shall make or draw or utter or
deliver, with intent to defraud, any check, draft or order, for the payment of money, upon any bank or other depositary, knowing at the time
of such making, drawing, uttering or delivering, that the maker or
drawer has not sufficient funds in or credit with such bank or other
depositary for the payment of such check, draft, or order, in full, upon
its presentation, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and punishable by
confinement in the county jail for not more than six months, or a fine
of not more than five hundred dollars, or both fine and confinement. If
the check, draft or order is one hundred dollars or more the offense is
a felony punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or
by confinement in the county jail for not more than one year, or by both
such fine and confinement or by imprisonment by the department of corrections for not more than five years.
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First, an essential element of the insufficient funds offense, the making,
drawing, uttering, or delivering a check upon a bank with knowledge that
there are insufficient funds or credit for payment in full upon presentation,
constitutes the false representation of a present or past fact. Also, intent
to defraud is common to both crimes. 4 Finally, about half the insufficient
funds statutes require reliance and actual defrauding by obtaining something of value. The concurrent existence of a broad false pretenses statute
and a specific insufficient funds statute will usually5 not prevent the
prosecutor from initiating the proceeding under the broader statute, 6 but
he must be able to prove every element of the crime of false pretenses7
8
or whatever broader statute is applicable.
Originally, the fundamental substantive, not evidentiary, distinction
between false pretenses and insufficient funds statutes was that the former
required a showing of actual defrauding by obtaining something of value
from the victim. However, with the advent early in this century of the
checking account system as the usual way of conducting business, many
states enacted statutes that made the mere issuance of a worthless check
a criminal act if there was an intent to defraud, regardless of reliance by
the victim or of actual defrauding. Under this approach, the primary focus
is upon the mischief to the system of commercial paper that a bad check
causes9 (especially in "check-kiting" schemes) 10 rather than upon the
4. As will be seen later in this comment (see pt. II, § A (1) 8, (2)), the
availability of prima fade proof for this element and for "knowledge" in most
insufficient funds statutes makes the statutes preferable to false pretenses statutes
from a prosecutor's point of view.
5. The majority view is that the broader statute is applicable so long as
there is reasonably strict adherence in the indictment and in the jury instructions to the language of the broader statute. Williams v. Territory, 13 Ariz. 27,
29, 108 P. 243 (1910); People v. Khan, 41 Cal. App. 393, 395-96, 182 P. 803, 804
(1919); see Annot., 35 A.L.R. 375 (1925). Some states, however, say that the insufficient funds statute excludes the broader statute in a prosecution involving
an insufficient funds check.
6. State v. Roderick, 85 Idaho 80, 84-85, 375 P.2d 1005, 1006-07 (1962); Marr
v. State, 227 Md. 510, 515, 177 A.2d 862, 864 (1962); State v. Evans, 153 Mont.
303, 305-06, 456 P.2d 842, 843 (1969); see Annot., 35 A.L.R. 344 (1925), 43
A.L.R. 49 (1926), 95 A.L.R 486 (1935), 174 A.L.R. 173 (1948).
7. Willis v. State, 205 Md. 118, 127, 106 A.2d 85, 89 (1954); see Whatley v.
State, 249 Ala. 355, 357, 31 So. 2d 665, 666 (1947); Burnley v. Commonwealth,
274 Ky. 18, 21, 117 S.W.2d 1008, 1009 (1938); Commonwealth v. McCall, 186
Ky. 301, 305, 217 S.W. 109, 110 (1920).
8. E.g., State v. Culver, 103 Ariz. 505, 507, 446 P.2d 234, 236 (1968); People v.
Cathony, 376 Ill. 260, 263, 33 N.E.2d 473, 475 (1941); Bafford v. State, 235 Md.
41, 44, 200 A.2d 142, 144 (1964). But cf. State v. Perrigoue, 81 Wash.2d 640, 503
P.2d 9.
1063See(1972).
Ex parte Shackleford, 64 Cal. App. 78, 80, 220 P.
430, 431 (1923);
State v. Marshall, 152 Kan. 607, 608, 106 P.2d 688, 689 (1940); State v. Avery,
111 Kan. 588, 590-91, 207 P. 838, 839 (1922); Kaufman v. State, 199 Md. 35,
39, 85 A.2d 446, 448 (1952).
10. Check-kiting is a fraudulent scheme whereby a person uses checking
accounts at several different banks. The actor deposits a bad check written
on another bank and then draws a check payable to an outside party on his
new account. Banks can get insurance against losses from paying on a check drawn
on an account that is made up of "uncollected funds" checks. See generally
United States v. Bessesen, 445 F.2d 463 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984
(1971); First Nat'l Bank v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 424 F.2d 312 (7th
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/6
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harm to the individual victim caused by his being defrauded. This type
of statute has carried over into more than half of the American jurisdictions." The other states maintain a closer relation to the false pretenses
formulation in that they require that the defendant obtain something of
value as a result of making the bad check.' 2
Despite this major difference in the current insufficient funds statutes,
the following questions are common: (1) What acts constitute a violation? (2) What is intent to defraud? (8) What is knowledge of insufficiency?
(4) If there is a consideration requirement, what constitutes consideration?
And, (5) what are the penalties? The remainder of section A is an attempt to answer these questions.
1. Acts Constituting a Violation
The normal description of the acts necessary to constitute a bad check
violation is "any person ... who shall make, draw, utter or deliver. ..
any check, draft, or order, for the payment of money ... upon any bank
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939 (1970); Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America v.
Pioneer Valley Say. Bank, 343 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1965); National Bank of Commerce v. Fidelity c Gas. Co., 312 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd per curiam,
437 F.2d 97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 906 (1971).
11. AL.sxA STAT. §§ 11.20.210-.250 (1962); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-316
(Supp. 5, 1972); CAL. PENAL CODE § 476 (a) (West 1970); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-5-205 (Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-128 (1972); DEL. CODE ANN.
fit. 11, § 555 (1953); D.C. CODE ENCYC. ANN. § 22-1410 (Supp. 1970); HAwAII
PENAL CODE § 857 (tit. 37, § 857, [1972] Hawaii Acts 104); IDAHO CODE § 18-3106
(Supp. 4, 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3707 to 3709 (Supp. II, 1972); Ky. Rnv.
STAT. § 434.070 (1973); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 1605-06 (1965); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 226, § 37 (1970); MicIi. CoMB. LAws ANN. § 750.131-.133 (1968);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.535 (Supp. 40, 1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-2702
(1969); Nr. REv. STAT. §§ 28-1213 to 1214 (Supp. 1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 582.12 (Supp. 5, 1972), §§ 582.13-.14 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:111-15 to 17
(1969)

(but by case law money may have to be obtained); N.Y. PENAL LAW
STAT. §§ 14-106 to 107 (1969), as
amended, (Supp. lB, 1971) (goes to both consideration and mere passing);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-08-16 (Supp. I, 1971); OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 2911.111
(Page Supp. 29, 1972); ORE. REv. STAT. § 165.065 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 4105 (Supp. 18, 197); P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1851-54 (1969); R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. §§ 19-19-2 to 4 (1956); TE. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 567 (b) (Supp. IA,
1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2311 (Supp. 9, 1972), § 2312 (1970) (noncriminal);
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 835 (1964). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.5 (Prop.
Official Draft, 1962).
12. ArA. CODE tit. 14, § 234 (9)- (21) (Supp. 5, 1971); ARm. STAT. ANN.
§ 67-720 (Supp. 6, 1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 832.05 (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1704 (1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 17-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3030 (1) (b), 10-3040 (3) (f) (Burns Supp. 4, part 2, 1972); IowA
CODE §§ 713.3-.4 (1973); LA. REv. STAT. § 14:71 (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 142 (Supp. 3, 1972); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-19-1 (1972); § 561.460, RSMo
1969; NEv. RFgv. STAT. § 205.130 (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 4049-1 to -9 (1972);
OiLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 21, § 1541.4 (Supp. 21, 1972); ORE. REv. STAT. § 164.085
(1971); S.C. ConE ANN. §§ 8-176 to -178 (Supp. I, 1971); S.D. Comxsri_ LAws
ANN. §§ 22-41-1 to -3 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-1959 to -1967 (Supp. 7, 1967);
UTAn CODE ANN. § 76-20-11 (Supp. 8, 1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-115 to -118
(1973); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.54.050 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-39
(1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.24 (1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-39, 6-40 (1957).
See generally Commonwealth v. Bonetti, 211 Pa. Super. 161, 164, 235 A.2d 447,

§§ 190.00-.15 (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN.

449 (1967) (dictum); State v. Cunningham, 90 W. Va. 806, 809-10, 111 S.E. 835,
837 (1922).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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or other depositary .... "13 This description presents four separate aspects: A person; an act; a certain type of instrument; and a specific drawee.
One type of person upon whom criminal liability obviously falls is
the drawer or maker of an insufficient funds check. Less dear is the liability
of a person in a position of authority who directs a subordinate to write
a bad check. The statutes of some states specifically deal with this problem by referring to any person who "causes or directs" another to write
the check. 14 A less certain area involves imposing the criminal sanction
upon a person who permits others to write checks on his account, thereby
making the account insufficient for the check under prosecution. Although
this situation arguably removes the maker's knowledge of insufficiency, 15
at least one court has held the maker criminally liable.'(
The usual formulation of the action itself is "make, draw, utter or
deliver." Although "making" and "drawing" clearly refer only to the
original maker, "utter" may extend to an indorser as well.' 7 Nevertheless,
to insure that an indorser is within the statute's purview, some states
include "passing" in the list of prohibited acts.' 8 The Michigan Revised
Criminal Code-Final Draft (Proposed) shortens its formulation of the
actus reus by using the Uniform Commercial Code term "negotiate."
"Negotiate" encompasses both making and passing while also including
"delivery," which the Code defines as the "voluntary transfer of possession."' 9
13. See statute quoted note 3 supra.
14. Alabama, Connecticut, Hawaii, Montana, New York, and North Dakota
are such states. Colorado and New York provide for an affirmative defense for
the individual who acts without personal knowledge and at the drawer's order.
See statutes cited notes 11 & 12 supra. This problem can also be couched in terms
of a corporate officer who writes a bad check on the corporate account. There
is limited authority for the proposition that the corporation, and not the man, is
liable for a fine. See People v. Fleishman, 133 Misc. 288, 232 N.Y.S. 187 (Magis.
Ct. 1928). The statutes of Florida, Maryland, and North Carolina mention the
corporation as a guilty party; the TEx. PENAL CODE PROP. REvISiON § 32.41 (a)
(Final Draft, 1971) does also. The general rule, however, is that the corporate
officer himself will bear the criminal burden. Clifton v. State, 51 Del. 339, 145
A.2d 392 (1958); Thompson v. State, 85 Ga. App. 298, 69 S.E.2d 206 (1952);
State v. Dowless, 217 N.C. 589, 9 S.E.2d 18 (1940); In re Hertz, 161 Ohio St.
70, 117 N.E.2d 925, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 957 (1954); Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1269
(1959). California, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Utah have codified this majority rule; and New Jersey extends the
reasoning to member of a partnership. See statutes cited notes 11 & 12 supra. See
also People v. Stills, 302 M11.
App. 302, 308, 23 N.E.2d 822, 825 (1939).
15. See pt. II, § B (3) of this comment.
16. See Moore v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 118, 124-25, 250 P.2d 46, 53 (1952).
17. See generally State v. Vandenburg, 39 Del. 498, 507, 2 A.2d 916, 921
(1938) (dictum).
18. These jurisdictions include Colorado, Idaho, New York, and Puerto
Rico. See statutes cited notes 11 and 12 supra. See also MoDEL PENAL CODE § 224.5
(Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
19. UmFORm CoMMRciAL CoDE §§ 3-202, 1-201 (14). Constructions of "delivery" usually arise in venue challenges. Generally, the place of delivery is either
the place of receipt or the place of the final act that leads to receipt. See People v.
Greenwood, 207 Cal. App. 2d 300, 304, 24 Cal. Rptr. 337, 340 (1962); People v.
Larue, 28 Cal. App. 2d 748, 753, 83 P.2d 725, 728 (1938). The usual ruling is
that venue is proper both in the county in which the check was mailed or in the
county of receipt. Id.; People v. Parker, 51 Misc. 2d 843, 845, 274 N.Y.S.2d 38,
41 (Ct Spec. Sess. 1966). But cf. State v. Athans, 490 S.W.2d 25, 26 (Mo. 1973).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/6
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Most insufficient funds statutes define the type of instrument covered
as a "check, draft, or order, for the payment of money, upon any bank
or other depositary." 20 Thus, a possible way to show the inapplicability
of the statute is to characterize the instrument in question as something
22
else.2 1 Certain jurisdictions strictly interpret what constitutes a check
for purposes of the statute and will not include such incomplete instruments as a check without an amount or a payee. 23 The favored position,
however, in the "no-payee" situation is that such an instrument authorizes
any holder to fill in the blank. 24 Moreover, a broader view of what constitutes a check or draft in the "no-payee" situation is found in section
3-805 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which states that any instrument
not payable to "order or bearer" remains negotiable, although there can
be no holder in due course on such an instrument. 2 6 Since all insufficient
funds statutes are at least implicitly concerned with the flow of worthless
commercial paper, this broader view may be preferable because it encompasses a wider range of potentially worthless and harmful instruments. 20
Most statutes require that the check be drawn upon "any bank or
other depositary."2 7 The vast majority of bad checks will fit this requirement as a matter of course, but the words "other depositary" may be unconstitutionally vague. One jurisdiction specifically includes savings banks
and trust companies 28 and, in effect, forecloses such a "vagueness" attack.
2. Intent to Defraud
Virtually every insufficient funds statute requires specific intent to

defraud.2 9 The prosecution must separately prove this element, and the
20. See statute quoted note 3 supra.
21. See State v. Brazzell, 248 S.C. 118, 124, 149 S.E.2d 339, 342-43 (1966).
22. UNIFORM CO MMRCIAL CODE § 3-104 sets out the accepted definitions of
the instruments involved in insufficient funds statutes.
23. State v. Ivey, 248 N.C. 316, 318, 103 S.E.2d 398, 399 (1958); Commonwealth v. Ali, 438 Pa. 463, 467, 265 A.2d 796, 798 (1970). But cf., State v. Kleen,
491 S.W.2d 244, 245-46 (Mo. 1973).
24. State v. Campbell, 70 Idaho 408, 415, 219 P.2d 956, 960 (1950); State v.
Donaldson, 14 Utah 2d 401, 402, 385 P.2d 151, 151-52 (1963).
25. UNIFORM Com-mERcLA CODE § 3-805 has been applied to broaden the
coverage of the statute by including certain instruments that are still negotiable but
of which there could be no holder in due course. Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815,
821-22 (Alas. 1968).
26. It is pertinent to distinguish between the crime of passing insufficient
funds checks and other crimes that stem from checks that appear to be valid on
their faces. The most obvious example is forgery. Where there is a named payee
on the check and the account is sufficient, a fraudulent endorsement is a forgery
and not an insufficient funds violation. Bafford v. State, 235 Md. 41, 44, 200
A.2d 142, 144 (1964). There is an argument that the statutes cover only "false" or
"bogus" checks and the state must therefore prove that the checks themselves are
bogus. This type of argument is usually unsuccessful. State v. Casey, 10 Ariz. App.
516, 519, 460 P.2d 52, 55 (1969).
27. See statute quoted note 3 supra;UNIFORM Co NmraAL CODE § 3-104 (2) (b).
28. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 19-19-2, -3 (1956). See also NEB. Rnv. STAT.
§ 28-1213 (Supp. 1971); Law of June 24, 1939, Pub. L. No. 874, § 854, [1939]
Pa. Laws 18 (repealed 1973).
29. Specific intent to defraud is an element in all of the statutes cited in
notes 11 and 12 supra except those of Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, South Carolina, Vermont, the Virgin Islands, and Wisconsin.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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mere passing of an insufficient funds check will normally not imply such
intent. Moreover, the prosecution must show that this intent was simultaneous with the criminal act. 30 Because proving such intent can be an

elusive undertaking, the prosecutor usually has available two methods of
doing so. First, he may always prove the requisite intent by direct or
circumstantial evidence. 31 In addition, most insufficient funds statutes contain a section providing for prima facie proof of intent to defraud.
All circumstances surrounding the making or delivery of the check
are relevant to the issue of intent.32 The most influential of these circumstances is the defendant's commission of similar offenses (i.e., passing other
worthless checks). Because specific intent is an element of these other
offenses, they are probative and admissible on the issue of intent with
respect to the check under consideration. 33 Another circumstance that may
aid the prosecutor in proving intent is that the defendant stopped payment
on a check after issuing it. There are many reasons, however, why a person
would stop payment, and the defendant could properly argue that stopping
payment was irrelevant to his intent at the time of issuance.
The prima fade evidence section of an insufficient funds statute raises
34
an inference, upon proof of certain facts, of defendant's intent to defraud
at the time of commission of the act.35 From a prosecutor's viewpoint,

this makes proceeding under an insufficient funds statute more desirable
than proceeding under a false pretenses statute. A typical prima facie
evidence section names the person against whom it operates and the acts
of the defendant and others that will bring the section into operation.
It also includes those elements of the crime upon which it will operate.
Moreover, most allow the defendant some way, within time limits, of
preventing the use of the inference.386
Also, intent to defraud is not an express element in some of the proposed codes.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.5 (Prop. Official Draft, 1962); MicH. REv. CRnr.
CODE § 4040 (Final Draft, 1967); MONT. PROP. CODE § 94-6-130 (1) (1970); S.C.
CRlM. CODE § 17.1 (6) (Prop. Draft, 1971); Txx. PENAL CODE PROP. RE ISON
§ 32.41 (a) (Final Draft, 1970).
30. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 32, 34 (1961).
31. Texas has codified this option. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 567 (b) (2)
(Supp. IA, 1972). See also TEx. PEN'AL CODE PROP. RZvisION § 32.41 (b) (Final
Draft, 1970).
32. See generally State v. Daymus, 90 Ariz. 294, 299, 367 P.2d 647, 651 (1961);
People v. Harding, 171 Cal. App. 2d 465, 466, 340 P.2d 656, 657 (1959); State v.
McKay, 79 N.M. 797, 800, 450 P.2d 435, 438 (Ct. App. 1969); State v. Brewer,
S.D. _ 197 N.W.2d 409, 410 (1972); Brewer v. State, 473 S.W.2d 938, 939
(Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
33. Swan v. State, 245 Ark. 154, 156, 431 S.W.2d 475, 476 (1968); People v.
Bandy, 216 Cal. App. 2d 458, 464, 31 Cal. Rptr. 10, 14 (1963); People v. Haines,
176 Cal. App. 2d 41, 45, 1 Cal. Rptr. 41, 43 (1959); State v. Marshall, 152 Kan.
607, 608, 106 P.2d 688, 689 (1940); Crum v. State, 427 S.W.2d 623, 623-24 (rex.
Crim App. 1968). Of course, the prosecutor's or the judge's preoccupation with
these acts in the presence of the jury may cause such evidence to become inIowa-_, 176 N.W.2d 867 (1970).
flammatory. State v. Kimball,
34. Most of the discussion concerning prima fade evidence sections is also
applicable to the element of knowledge of insufficiency.
35. 1 F. WHARTON, CmaIsNAL EviDENcE § 93 (13th ed. C. Torcia 1972).
36. A typical example of such a prima facie evidence section is § 561.470,
RSMo 1973 Supp., which states:
As against the maker or drawer thereof, the making, drawing, uttering or
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/6
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Prima fade evidence sections usually operate against only the maker
or drawer. Thus, the prosecution must generally prove a passer's or deliverer's intent to defraud without the aid of a prima fade evidence section.
The acts that must be proved in order to raise the inference usually
are (1) the making or drawing of the instrument by the defendant and (2)
the refusal of payment by the drawee bank. 7 A common, explicit addition to these acts is presentment to the drawee bank within a reasonable
period of time after issuance, 8 even though presentment is always implicit as the link between the making and the refusal. This addition requires showing a third person's conduct in order to make the section
applicable. The real importance of the presentment addition, however,
is that it necessitates presentment within a reasonable period of time,
thus preventing use of the section on "cold" checks. Some jurisdictions
do not require a showing of refusal of payment, 89 but allow the section
to operate only after notice of dishonor because there may be many reasons
for refusal of payment that are out of the drawer's control.
Once prima fade evidence is produced, the question becomes: Upon
what elements of the crime will the inference thereby raised operate? The
normal approach is that prima fade proof goes to both intent to defraud
and knowledge of insuffidency.40 In addition, some statutes provide prima
fade proof for the "proved" facts of making, presentment, and dishonor,
as well as for insufficiency at time of issuance. 41 Most statutes, however,
do not spedfy how these latter factors may be proved. Under the latter
type of statute, they must usually be established by testimony from a
representative of the drawee bank.42 In some jurisdictions, the check with
the bank's notation on it will be evidence of issuance, presentment and
43
dishonor.
delivering of a check, draft or order, payment of which is refused by the
drawee, shall be prima fade evidence of intent to defraud and of
knowledge of insuffident funds in or credit with such bank or other
depositary, provided such maker or drawer shall not have paid the drawee
thereof the amount due thereon, together with all costs and protest fees,
within ten days after receiving notice that such check, draft or order
has not been paid by the drawee.
37. These are the acts that initially establish prima fade evidence in the
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virgin Islands, Virginia, and
West Virginia (this state's statutory language is vague). See statutes dted notes

11 & 12 supra.

38. This addition appears in the statutes of Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, North
Dakota, and Texas. See statutes cited notes 11 & 12 supra. See also Bethune v.
State, 44 Ala. App. 30, 33, 202 So. 2d 46, 47-48, cert. denied, 281 Ala. 715, 202
So. 2d 48 (1967).
39. State v. Posey, 77 Wyo. 258, 267, 314 P.2d 833, 836-37 (1957). But see
IowA CODE § 713.4 (1973), in which refusal of payment alone initially establishes

prima fade evidence of intent to defraud.
40. See statute quoted note 36 supra.
41. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:111-16 (1969); N.Y. PENAL. LA.w § 190.10 (3) (McKinney 1967). See also Shargaa v. State, 84 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1955).
42. A bank official's testimony is not always necessary in this drcumstance.
See Commonwealth v. Bonetti, 211 Pa. Super. 161, 164, 235 A.2d 447, 448-49 (1967).
43. Compare Christ v. State, 480 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)
(no-account case), with Meadows v. State, 220 Tenn. 615, 622, 421 S.W.2d 639,
642-43 (1967) (no-account case). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-117.1 (1973).
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If the prima fade evidence section is othervise applicable, the defendant may prevent the section's operation by taking certain actions.
First, he may "make good" within a specified period after notice of
dishonor. Although generally the drawer or maker must make the payments, one statute dearly allows another to act in his place.44 There is
some difference in the statutes as to who should receive the payment.
Several jurisdictions specify the drawee as the redpient, 45 another points
48
to the payee, 46 others specify the "holder," 47 and still others are silent.
Another aspect of preventing use of the prima fade evidence section is
the time limit in which the drawer or maker must make the payment.
Depending upon the statute, the number of days after notice of dishonor
in which the defendant can made good varies from 5 to 15.49 Further
problems arise, however, in determining who is to give the notice that
starts the running of the time period and how such notice is to be given.
Most statutes are silent as to both aspects, and in many cases, the prosecutor
himself has taken on the responsibility. 50 However, the concepts found in
section 3-508 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 which covers both
aspects, 52 may provide a solution for the troubled prosecutor. Section
3-508 (1) implies that either the holder or the bank may give notice, but
the comment to that section specifies that it is usually the holder himself.
Sections 3-508 (3) and (4) further specify that notice may be given in any
reasonable manner, oral or 'written,53 and is deemed to have been given
when sent. Many statutes, however, require certified or registered mail for
effective notice under the prima fade evidence sections. 54
Since the earliest cases construing insufficient funds statutes, it has
been clear that presentment, refusal of payment, and notice of dishonor 55
44. VA. CODE ANN.§ 6.1-117 (1973). See also COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 40-5205 (7) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. PEN.AL LAw § 190.15 (1) (McKinney 1967); New York
makes restitution an affirmative defense.
45. Missouri, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania are such jurisdictions. See statutes
cited notes 11 & 12 supra.
46. NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1214 (Supp. 1971).
47. Mississippi, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia are such
jurisdictions. See statutes cited notes 11 & 12 supra.
48. New Mexico and West Virginia share this uncertainty. See statutes cited
notes 11 & 12 supra.
49. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-19-1 (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.24 (2) (1958)
(5 days).
50. Such is the practice in the Circuit Attorney's Office in the city of St.
Louis, Missouri. See also NrB. REv. STAT. § 28-1214 (Supp. 1971).
51. The Mici. REv. Cmi. CODE § 4040(2) (b) (Final Draft, 1967) incorporates the UNIFOar CoammRcA.L CODE § 3-508.

52. See generally Chapa v. State, 420 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967);
Huntt v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 737, 739, 187 S.E.2d 183, 186 (1972). Certain
statutes specify that a notice of protest, not a notice of dishonor, establishes
prima facie evidence. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-316 (c) (Supp. 5, 1972); CAL.
PENAL CODE tit. 13, § 476a (West 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-20-11 (3), (4) (Supp.
8, 1971).
53. Two of the new proposed statutes require written notice of dishonor.
MONT. PROP. CODE § 94-6-130 (1970); S.C. Camr. CODE § 17.1 (6) (Prop. Draft,
1971).
54. Such jurisdictions are Alabama, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Tennessee,
and Virginia. See statutes cited notes 11 & 12 supra.
55. Presentment and refusal of payment are almost elements of the crime
under certain formulations. See N.Y. PENeAL LAw § 190.10 (2) (McKinney 1967).
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are not actual elements of the crime, but are merely evidentiary factors.5 0
Because the crime is "making with intent to defraud" (plus consideration
in some statutes), it is theoretically complete before presentment, refusal
of payment, or notice of dishonor. Consequently, the state can prosecute
regardless of whether these factors are present.57 Nevertheless, at least
presentment and refusal of payment are tacit elements, because they are
the most common prerequisites to invoking the prima facie evidence
section. While application of the prima fade evidence section is obviously
not conclusive of the result in an insufficient funds prosecution,58 the
prosecution's chances of success depend on the section, because without
it, elements such as intent to defraud would be virtually impossible to
prove.
3. Knowledge of Insufficiency
Knowledge of insufficiency, along with intent to defraud, is the
equivalent of the false pretenses statute's element of a "knowing misrepresentation of a past or present fact." The element of knowledge is
present in all but eight of the insufficient funds statutes currently in

effect. 59 The standard formulation of this element is "knowing at the
time of such making... that the maker or drawer has not sufficient funds
or credit with such bank... for payment of the check in full upon presentation." 60 Because this knowledge is difficult to prove, a prima fade evidence section may be even more helpful with respect to this element
than it is with intent to defraud.
One aspect of this element is the time at which knowledge of insufficiency must exist. Some statutes are apparently based upon the theory
that the insufficient funds offense must involve misrepresentation of an
existing fact. These statutes thus require knowledge that the account was
insufficient at the very instant of the issuance of the check. 01 Some states,
56. State v. Callahan, 23 Conn. Supp. 374, 183 A.2d 861 (App. Div. 1962);
Merkel v. State, 167 Wis. 512, 514, 167 N.W. 802, 803 (1918). Contra., Commonwealth v. McCall, 186 Ky. 301, 306, 217 S.W. 109, 111 (1919).
57. See generally Cook v. State, 170 Tenn. 245, 249-50, 94 S.W.2d 386, 388
(1936) (dictum).
58. A prima fade evidence section cannot create a presumption of guilt;
it merely shifts the risk of nonproduction of evidence. As to those elements upon
which the risk is shifted, the state can benefit from an inference of their truth
until the defendant shows substantial evidence to negate them. E.g., State v.
Coleman, 17 Utah 2d 166, 169, 406 P.2d 308, 310-11 (1965). But cf. Rinkov v.
Commonwealth, 213 Va. 307, 191 S.E.2d 731 (1972). Whether the defendant can
do this or not, the state must still prove all of the elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Turetsky, 78 N.J. Super. 203, 216-17, 188 A.2d 198,
205-06 (App. Div. 1963).
59. The states that omit knowledge of insufficiency as an element are: Maryland, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, and
Wisconsin. See statutes cited notes 11 & 12 supra. But cf. Woodall v. State, 242
Ind. 233, 177 N.E.2d 910 (1961).
60. See statute quoted note 3 supra.
61. Jurisdictions that have a time element are: Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Iowa, Maine, Michigan,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virgin Islands, Virginia, West Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. See statutes cited notes 11 &-12 supra. See also
Henson v. United States, 287 A.2d 106 (D.C. App. 1972) (no-account case). This
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however, view this interpretation of the crime as being too narrow, reasoning that a person could easily have sufficient funds at the issuance of the
check and yet at the same time know that either outstanding checks or
subsequent withdrawals will make the account insufficient. Under such
circumstances, there would be misrepresentation of future, not a present,
fact, and the misrepresentation would be outside the criminal boundary
of a false pretenses statute. Because the crime of insufficient funds is a
separate and distinct offense, a number of states specifically provide for
the situation in which the maker knows at the time he passes the check
that outstanding checks will make the account insufficient.0 2 Also, certain

statutes cover the situation where later withdrawals render the account

insufficient. 63 The distinction between misrepresentation of a present fact

and knowledge of insufficiency is sometimes expressly made by statutes
which state that knowledge of insufficiency may exist even without an
express misrepresentation at the time of the commission of the act. 64 Some
statutes deal with these problems in very broad language, such as "knows it
will not be honored," 6 5 or "having reasonable cause to know... that it will
not be paid," 66 or has "no expectation" that it will be honored. 67 Under
these statutes, insufficiency is determined at presentment, 68 not at writing,
and, assuming the prima facie evidence section is not used, knowledge at
presentment may be proved by circumstantial evidence. 69 Finally, at least
one statute simply fails to specify the time at which the knowledge of
insufficiency must be present.7 0
A subtle issue under the knowledge element is whose account must be
insufficient. Where the drawer or maker is the defendant, it is obviously
his knowledge of the insufficiency of his own account that is pertinent.
It is a more difficult case, however, when the defendant is a passer or
deliverer of another's check. The passer must have knowledge of the
insufficiency of the drawer's account before he is criminally liable. But
present knowledge can be refuted by the defendant by showing that unbeknownst
to him there was a levy on his account. Cowart v. State, 123 Ga. App. 495, 181
S.E.2d 519 (1971). He can further refute it by showing that checks which he had
deposited in his account were not honored. State v. McCord, 258 S.C. 163, 167,
187 S.E.2d 654, 656 (1972). See generally State v. Bettis, 27 Utah 2d 373, 374, 496
P.2d 715 (1972).
62. Alabama, Arizona, California, Tennessee, Texas, and Mississippi are
such states. See statutes cited notes 11 & 12 supra.
63. ALA. CODE tit 14, § 234 (15) (Supp. 5, 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 832.05 (6)
(1961).
64. Such statutes can be found in California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Virginia, and Wyoming. See statutes cited notes 11 &c12 supra.
65. This language is found in the formulations of Alaska, Idaho, Iowa, and
New York. See statutes cited notes 11 & 12 supra. See also MONT. PROP. CODE §
94-6-130 (1) (1970); MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.5 (Prop. Official Draft, 1962); N.J.
PENAL CODE § 2C:21-5 (Final Draft, 1971); TEx. PENAL CODE PROP. REvISiON §
32.41 (a) (Final Draft, 1970).
66. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-5-205 (3) (a), (b) (Supp. 1971).
67. MicH. REv. Cmrn.

CODE

§ 4040 (1) (Final Draft, 1967).

68. State v. DeNicola, 163 Ohio St. 140, 144-45, 126 N.E.2d 62, 65 (1955).
69. See generally Garroute v. State, 241 Ark. 285, 286, 408 S.W.2d 485,
485-86 (1966); Maki v. State, 239 Md. 311, 313, 211 A.2d 711, 712 (1965); State
v. Martin, 177 Neb. 209, 212-13, 128 N.W.2d 583, 586 (1964).
70. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. cl. 266, § 37 (1970).
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most prima fade evidence sections are inoperative with respect to a passer.
Many states only implicitly refer to the problem of the passer's knowledge
of the insuffidency of the drawer's account; 71 few face the problem
directly.72
The insufficiency of "funds" in an account is seldom at issue, because
the bank can accurately show the state of the drawer's account at a given
point in time. There may be a question, however, as to the insufficiency
of "credit." The statutes often define "credit" as an "arrangement or understanding" with the bank for the payment of such checks.73 A drawer may
point to the bank's habit of paying overdrafts as being such an understanding.
The phrase "payment in full upon presentation," which is standard
in most statutes, further complicates the time factor discussed above. The
phrase requires that the defendant have knowledge at the time of drawing
that upon presentation there will be insufficient funds. This puts an
act that constitutes part of an element of the criminal offense in the control of a third person, because the maker has no control over when the
presentation will be made. This has 74been the basis for a constitutional
attack upon insufficient funds statutes.
Proof of knowledge of insufficiency depends, even more than proof
of intent to defraud, upon the prima fade evidence sections. 7 5 Usually,
such sections apply to both elements. Because more statutes require knowledge than require specific intent, there is a greater variety of methods to
establish prima fade evidence on the knowledge element. For example, one
state's statute provides that the mere making of a bad check constitutes
70
prima fade evidence of knowledge unless payment is made before trial.
77
Other statutes provide that the drawee's refusal of payment or the drawer's
withdrawal of funds7 8 is prima fade evidence. Some ignore these factors
and merely look to the drawer's failure to make good after receiving notice
of dishonor.79 The two most common statutory prescriptions for establishing prima fade evidence of knowledge are: (1) Proof of making, refusal
of payment, and failure to make good within the prescribed period after
71. Section 561.460, RSMo 1969, states in part: "[A]ny person who . . .

shall... utter or deliver... any check ... knowing at the time of such ...
uttering or delivering that the maker or drawer has not sufficient funds ....

(emphasis added). The language specifies the bad actor as any person, but provides that such person's knowledge of insufficiency must be with respect to the
maker's or drawer's account.
72. See N.Y. PxNAL LAW § 195.05 (1), (2) (McKinney 1967); S.C. GuMr. CODE
§ 17.1 (6) (Prop. Draft, 1971).
73. E.g., § 561.480, RSMo 1969 states:
The word "credit" as used in sections 561.460 to 561.480 shall be con-

strued to mean an arrangement or understanding with the bank or

depositary, for the payment of such check, draft or order.
74. See text accompanying notes 151 &:152 infra.
75. Only Louisiana, Kentucky, and Washington do not provide a prima
fade evidence section for the element of knowledge of insufficiency. See statutes
cited notes 11 &c12 supra.
76. W. VA.

77.

CODE ANN.

§ 61-3-39 (1966).

IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3040 (3) (f) (Supp.
78. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 832.05 (6) (1965).

IV, part 2, 1972).

79. DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 11, § 555 (c) (1953).
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notice of dishonor;5 3 and (2) proof of presentation of the check within
30 days of its issuance, refusal of payment, and failure to make good.8 1
Both of these methods involve problems similar to those arising from
the application of prima facie evidence sections to the element of intent to
defraud.
The second approach represents the trend in many of the newer
insufficient funds statutes. 8 2 The 30-day period applies the time limit set
forth in section 3-305 (2) (a) of the Uniform Commercial Code. Because
presentment, refusal of payment, notice of dishonor, and the actor's failure
to make good are the factors establishing the prima fade evidence of
knowledge, it is also the trend in the newer statutes to allow "notice of
protest" to be prima facie evidence of all three.8 3 Notice of protest is
defined in section 3-509 of the Uniform Commercial Code as a certificate
of dishonor made under a seal of a notary or other person who is authorized
by local law to certify a dishonor. Use of the notice of protest would not
only ease the prosecutor's burden of giving notice, but it would also
negate the defendant's argument that presentment and dishonor have
not been proved because the check itself fails to indicate that they have
occurred.
4. Consideration

Slightly fewer than half of the current insufficient funds statutes
require, as an element, that the actor obtain property or "something of
value."841 Among the statutes that do not have this element, there are
several that elevate the crime to larceny by check when consideration is
received.85 The theory behind this latter type of statute is that the mere
issuance of a bad check, with its consequent mischief to the business
world, is an act that the legislature deems criminal.8 6
80. Jurisdictions following this method include Kansas, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and the Virgin Islands. See statutes cited notes 11
& 12 supra.
81. Colorado, Connecticut, Alaska, Idaho, Iowa, Georgia, and New York
follow this rule. See statutes cited notes 11 and 12 supra. For a construction of
"presentation," see Fortune v. State, 125 Tex. Crim. 11, 12, 66 S.W.2d 304, 304
(1933).
82. MODEL PrAL CODE § 224.5 (Prop. Official Draft, 1962); N.J. PENAL CODE
§ 2C:21-5 (Final Draft, 1971); TEx. PENAL CODE PROP. REVIsION § 32.41 (b) (Final
Draft, 1970).
83. Arizona, California, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York
provide for "notice of protest." Tennessee and Mississippi allow the bank's own
notation, if dearly marked, to be evidence of presentment and dishonor. See
statutes cited notes 11 & 12 supra.
84. See statutes cited note 12 supra. See generally State v. Davis, 26 N.M.
523, 525, 194 P. 882, 882 (1921); Simpson v. State, 267 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Okla.

Crim. App. 1954).

85. MAss. GEN. LAws AN N. ch. 266, § 37 (1970); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
582:12 (Supp. 5, 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-117 (1973). See generally Helms v.
State, 128 So. 2d 756, 758 (Fla. App. 1961); State v. Roderick, 85 Idaho 80, 84,
375 P.2d 1005, 1006-07 (1962); State v. Covington, 59 N.J. 536, 537-38, 284 A.2d
532, 533 (1971); People v. Miller, 29 App. Div. 2d 921, 286 N.Y.S. 2d 488 (1968);
Persinger v. Rhay, 52 Wash. 2d 762, 766-67, 329 P.2d 191, 194 (1958).
86. State v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 590-91, 207 P. 838, 839 (1922); State v.
Bradley, 190 Wash, 538, 546, 69 P.2d 819, 822-23 (1937); see text accompanying
notes 9 9: 10 supra.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/6

12

Crowe: Crowe: Insufficient Funds Checks
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

Where consideration is an element, the most frequent formulation is
"obtain money, property or thing of value."82' "Obtain," which has been
the subject of some litigation, is usually held to mean getting all rights
of immediate possession.88 It also covers the situation where the actor has
converted the property into cash or otherwise disposed of it so as to prevent
its recovery.8 9
Unquestionably, the most complex issue under the consideration element is whether a pre-existing debt is a "thing of value."0 0 Some statutes
specifically state that a pre-existing debt is consideration. 91 The rationale
behind the statutes that do not is that the bad check does not defraud
the victim of anything because the debt still exists. 02 Even states that do
not require consideration sometimes confront the pre-existing debt issue
in determining whether the defendant had intent to defraud. In this
situation, the normal rule is that while the fact that a check written for
a pre-existing debt will not overcome prima fade evidence of intent to
defraud, 3 it may be indicative of the defendant's innocence in the absence
of strong evidence of intent.94
There are a variety of particular types of pre-existing debts that cause
difficulty. Earned wages are a prime example. Although it has been held
that an employer obtains nothing of value when he issues a bad check
in purported payment of wages, 05 some statutes specifically include wages
as valid consideration.9 6 The same argument can be made as to payments
for services rendered (where there is no actual employer-employee rela87. Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming employ
this formulation. See statutes cited notes 11 & 12 supra.
88. Compare Gill v. State, 235 So. 2d 751, 752 (Fla. App. 1970), with State
v. Kulow, 255 Iowa 789, 793, 123 N.W.2d 872, 874-75 (1963).
89. Moore v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 118, 122, 250 P.2d 46, 50-51 (1952).
90. Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1159 (1958).
91. The statutes in Alabama, Maryland, Missouri, and Wyoming so provide;
but those in Colorado, Georgia, Mississippi, and Wisconsin are expressly to
the contrary. See statutes cited notes 11 & 12 supra. See also Hutson v. State, 154
Tex. Crim. 380, 227 S.W.2d 813 (1950) ; Bailey v. State, 408 P.2d 244 (Wyo. 1965).
92. Moore v. People, 124 Colo. 197, 205-08, 235 P.2d 798, 802 (1951); State
v. Harris, 136 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1962); Berry v. State, 153 Ga. 169, 173-75, 111
S.E. 669, 672 (1922); Pollard v. State, .. Miss._, 244 So. 2d 729, 730 (1971);
Jackson v. State, 251 Miss. 529, 531, 170 So. 2d 438, 439 (1965); State v. Jarman,
84 Nev. 187, 190, 438 P.2d 250, 252-53 (1968); Hoyt v. Hoffman, 82 Nev. 270,
416 P.2d 233 (1966); State v. Stout, 142 W. Va. 182, 186-88, 95 S.E.2d 639, 648
(1956). But cf. State v. Turetsky, 78 N.J. Super. 203, 213, 188 A.2d 198, 203-04 (App.
Div. 1963).
93. Clarke v. United States, 263 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
94. State v. Riccardo, 32 N.J. Super. 89, 94, 107 A.2d 807, 810 (App. Div.
1954). Although most jurisdictions do not regard a pre-existing debt as something of value, there remains the possibility of bootstrapping such a debt. The
defendant may give an insufficent funds check for the debt and then, when
it is returned insufficent, exchange the first check for a second. If the second
check is also bad, the jurisdiction may view the exchange of checks as a separate
transaction and find consideration in the victim's giving of the first check. See
McCormick v. State, 161 So. 2d 696, 698 (Fla. App. 1964); Williams v. State,
198 Tenn. 439, 442, 281 S.W.2d 41, 42-43 (1955).
95. Maggard v. Commonwealth, 262 S.W.2d 672 (Ky. App. 1953); League v.
State, 1 Md. App. 681, 688, 232 A.2d 828, 832 (1967) (services).
96. States with such statutes include Maryland, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and
Wisconsin. See statutes cited notes 11 8 12 supra.
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certain statutes explicitly include services rendered as
tionship). Again,
97
consideration.
Because of defendants' many imaginative attempts to avoid the "thing
of value" characterization, legislatures have made piecemeal efforts to
foreclose such arguments as to certain items. For example, the terms "goods"
and "wares" have been added in some statutes to insure that such items
will be consideration. 98 Some statutes use the terminology "obtain control

over property"; there is an indication, however, that the criminal act is
complete if the check is given with the purpose to obtain control over
1 01
and
property. 99 More specific statutes include "lodging,"' 00 "rent,"
"materials or labor [for construction]. "102 A difficulty with such detailed
listings is that a court may limit the items available as consideration to
those listed. This may be avoided by such general language as "where
the maker receives a benefit or thing of value." 0 3 However, the word
"benefit" may be too broad, because it arguably includes a pre-existing
debt. Although the bad check does not erase the debt, the maker may
"benefit" by having put off his creditors for awhile.104 Some states include
the term "credit," despite the argument that a bad check given as collateral
06
for a loan is arguably noncriminal because the debt still exists.' Because
"credit" can mean extension of credit on a pre-existing debt, some states
use the words "additional credit ' 10 6 to insure that the statute applies only
where a new debt is created.
5. Penalties
Insufficient funds prosecutions often involve a series of checks. This
07
which may, in turn,
may allow for a separate count on each check,'
lead to a cumulation of sentences. Such cumulations may be subject to
attack as cruel and unusual, 0 8 but most current statutes include them.
Another feature in some statutes is a "totalling" provision whereby
all of the checks written over a given period are totalled, and the total
97. Such statutes can be found in Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, South Carolina, and Utah. See statutes cited notes 11 &
12 supra.
98. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 832.05 (3)(a) (1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-49-2 (D)
(1972).
99. MONT. PROP. CODE § 94-6-130 (1) (1970).
100. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-49-2 (D) (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-176 (Supp. I,
1971).
101.

UTAH CODE

ANN. § 76-6-505 (1) (Supp. 8, 1973).

102. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 142 (Supp. 3, 1972).
103. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1541.4 (Supp. 21, 1972).
104. Clarke v. United States, 263 F.2d 269, 270 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (dictum).
105. These states are Iowa, Maryland, South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See statutes cited notes 11 & 12 supra.
106. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-5-205 (2) (Supp. 1973); S.C. Caim. CODE §
17.1 (6) (Prop. Draft, 1971).
107. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-19-1 (1972).
108. Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815, 818-19 (Alas. 1968); Comment, The
Kansas Habitual Criminal Act, 9 WAsHru-P L.J. 244, 260-61 (1970). The normal
penal treatment for a single offense by a small check is to classify it a misdemeanor. See generally 14 U. MIAMI L. REv. 486 (1960). States that consider the
successive number of bad check offenses in allotting the penalty include Alabama,
California, Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina
and Texas. See statutes cited notes 11 & 12 supra.
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amount is used to determine whether the single prosecution will be for
a felony or a misdemeanor.10 9 Such totalling provisions have been subject
to attack on the grounds of vagueness" o and denial of due process.11 1
The complicated nature of statutes involving numbered offenses and totalling provisions (with the consequent uncertainty as to the possible penalties) may enable the defendant to defeat a guilty plea in a habeas corpus
proceeding on the ground of ineffective counsel if the defendant's attorney
has not properly apprised him of the penalty.
B. Defenses
Throughout the foregoing discussion of the elements of the crime of
passing insufficient funds checks, there have been implicit treatments of
defenses. Although any factor that will deny the existence of one of the
112
elements of the crime will, in a sense, serve as a defense to prosecution,
there are several traditional areas, which the statutes seldom mention, that
provide points for arguments by the defendant. These areas include postdated checks, reasonable expectation of payment, and restitution. Beyond
these, there are also the defenses that can be raised at any criminal prosecu14
tion such as duress1 13 and entrapment."
Theoretically, the scienter essential to a violation of the statute is
absent with regard to a post-dated check. The inference from post-dating
is that while the defendant may know that there are insufficient funds at

issuance, he expects that on the written date there will be sufficient

funds.115 The defendant's culpable intent is further absolved through the
recipient's compliance in taking a post-dated check, since the understanding is that present payment of the check is impossible. Thus, this
transaction takes on the appearance of a credit arrangement, and failure
of sufficient funds at the later date may well be for reasons beyond the
maker's control and intent at the date of issuance. Following this rationale,
some statutes expressly exclude post-dated checks." 8 In some jurisdictions,
post-dating is not alone a defense; there must also be evidence that the
109. Totalling provisions can be found in Alabama, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
and Utah. See statutes cited notes 11 & 12 supra.
110. State v. Ferris, 80 N.M. 663, 665-67, 459 P.2d 462, 464-65 (Ct. App. 1969).
111. Mathis v. State, 266 F. Supp. 841, 845 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
112. See generally Warner, Bad Checks, 37 Miss. L.J. 86 (1965).
113. State v. Lee, 78 N.M. 421, 423, 432 P.2d 265, 267 (Ct. App. 1967).
See also CoLo. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 40-5-205 (7) (b) (Supp. 1971); N.Y. PEN_, LAW
§ 190.15 (2) (McKinney 1967).
114. State v. Jackson, 243 N.C. 216, 220, 90 S.E.2d 507, 510 (1955). An exotic
defense could be lack of knowledge through blackouts. State v. Bettis, 27 Utah 2d
373, 374, 496 P.2d 715 (1972). Further potential defenses are insufficiency of
the indictment or of the jury instructions. State v. Brookshire, 104 Ariz. 349, 351,
452 P.2d 703, 704-05 (1969); State v. Veres, 7 Ariz. App. 117, 126, 436 P.2d 629,
638, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1014 (1968). Inflammatory statements to the jury is
also a trial defense. Sherman v. State, 255 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 1971).
115. See Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1181 (1953).
116. Florida, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, and South Carolina
have such statutes. See statutes cited notes 11 & 12 supra. See also State v. Stout,
8 Ariz. App. 545, 547-48, 448 P.2d 115, 117-18 (1968); People v. Kubitz, 37 Misc.
2d 453, 454, 235 N.Y.S.2d 971, 972 (Monroe County Ct. 1963); State v. Crawford,
198 N.C. 522, 524, 152 S.E. 504, 505 (1930).
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actor called the payee's attention to the post-dating.117 Other statutes provide that post-dating merely prevents the operation of the prima fade
11 8
evidence section.
A situation analogous to the post-dated check situation is where the
payee agrees to withhold presentment for a given period. 119 This, like the
post-dated check, is a credit-type arrangement. An argument against the
credit rationale is that the legislature's primary intent in passing a bad
check statute, aside from its desire to combat fraudulent schemes, was to
curb the flow of worthless commercial paper in the business world and that
20
an insufficient, post-dated check is still worthless.
The defendant may argue his reasonable expectation of payment as
a defense. 12 1 This is practically the mirror image of the post-dated check
situation. One aspect of that defense is that the payee has no reasonable
expectation of present payment, whereas here the defendant claims that
he had reasonable expectation of payment and, therefore, no criminal
intent. No statute, however, expressly provides for this defense. While
some statutes do set up as a defense the payee's reasonable belief, from
the surrounding circumstances or by direct notification, that the check
will be dishonored, 22 the term "reasonable expectation of payment" normally refers to the actor's intent or state of mind. Originally, the defendant
would show that through the ordinary course of the bank's business he
117. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 234 (12) (Supp. 5, 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3707 (3)
(Supp. II, 1972); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-08-16 (1) (Supp. 1, 1971). Whether such

disclosure was made constitutes a difficult factual question (e.g., State v. Ramsbottom, 89 Idaho 1, 7-8, 402 P.2d 384, 387-8 (1965)), upon which such evidence as
the course of dealings between the parties (Pollard v. State, - Miss. -, 244 So. 2d
729, 730 (1971)); Commonwealth v. Kelinson, 199 Pa. Super. 135, 142, 184 A.2d 374,
377 (1962)) and the fact that the payee held the check until the specified date
(People v. Burnett, 39 Cal. 2d 556, 560, 247 P.2d 828, 830 (1952)) is relevant.
118. CONN. GEN. STAT. AN. § 53 (a)-128 (b) (1972); N.J. P.NAL CODE § 2C:21-5
(Final Draft, 1971); TEx. PENAL CODE PROP. RmvIsION § 32.41 (b) (Final Draft,
1970). This would force the state to bring other evidence on intent and knowledge.
See People v. Poyet, 15 Cal. App. 3d 717, 720-25, 93 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396-99 (1971),
rev'd & vacated, 6 Cal. 3d 530, 429 P.2d 1150, 99 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1972); State v.
Bruce, 1 Utah 2d 136, 139, 262 P.2d 960, 962 (1953); State v. Etheridge, 74 Wash.

2d 102, 107-09, 443 P.2d 536, 540-41 (1968).

119. See People v. Will, 289 N.Y. 413, 415-16, 46 N.E.2d 498, 499 (1943);
People v. Nibur, 238 App. Div. 233, 264 N.Y.S. 148 (1933); State v. Myers, 15
Utah 2d 130, 131, 388 P.2d 801, 802 (1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3709 (Supp. II,
1972); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-08-16 (1) (Supp. 1, 1971).
120. Windle v. Wire, 179 Kan. 239, 241-42, 294 P.2d 213, 215 (1956) (dictum);
State v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 593, 207 P. 838, 840 (1922); State v. DeNicola, 163
Ohio St. 140, 143-44, 126 N.E.2d 62, 64-65 (1955).

The reasoning behind this argument is the same reasoning that supports the
omission of consideration as an element in an insufficient funds statute. See text
accompanying notes 9 & 86 supra.
121. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 719 (1966).
122. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-49-6 (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-176 (Supp. I, 1971).
See also Gilmore v. United States, 273 F.2d 79, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Florida goes
one step further by providing that the payee is assessed all the costs of the proceeding if at trial he is found to have had reason. to believe that the account
was insufficient. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 832.05 (6) (1965). Compare George v. State, 203
So. 2d 173, 176 (Fla. App. 1967), with Deitle v. State, 363 S.W.2d 939, 940 (Irex.
Crim. App. 1963).
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had a reasonable expectation that the check would be paid. 12- The
tendency today, however, is to depart from the restrictive "ordinary course
of business" language and to consider all circumstances. 124 In any case, to
constitute a successful defense the expectation must be more than a mere
hope, based, for example, on the success of a questionable business enterprise.'2 5 Although most jurisdictions do not expressly recognize it as a
defense, evidence of reasonable expectation can be relevant in a more
limited capacity to combat the state's evidence of intent to defraud. In
this regard, defendants' arguments based on deposited checks that were
unknowingly bad,126 arrangements with third parties, 2 7 and the defendant's disclosure to the payee that his account was insufficient1 2s have
prevailed.
Restitution is a statutory defense in one state; 12 9 the older cases recognize it only to a limited extent. 8 0 However, evidence of restitution, if

admissible,' 13 may rebut prima fade evidence of intent to defraud 182 or
direct evidence on that element.' 83 If the crime is considered complete at
the passing or making of the bad check, restitution must be viewed as a
collateral matter because it can only follow the commission of the crime.
Practically, however, there often will be no prosecution if the parties
128. People v. Rubin, 223 Cal. App. 2d 825, 834, 36 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172 (1968);
People v. Griffith, 120 Cal. App. 2d 873, 880, 262 P.2d 855, 359 (1953); State
v. Johnson, 77 Minn. 267, 271, 79 N.W. 968, 969 (1899); State v. Shock, 58 N.D.
340, 344, 226 N.W. 525, 526-27 (1929).
124. People v. Poyet, 6 Cal. 3d 530, 492 P.2d 1150, 99 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1972).
But ef. United States v. Bessemen, 445 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 984 (1971).
125. See Williams v. United States, 278 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1960); United
States v. Broxmeyer, 192 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1951) (dictum); People v.
Croxton, 162 Cal. App. 2d 187, 193-94, 327 P.2d 611, 614 (1958).
126. People v. Brown, 141 Cal. App. 2d 299, 301, 296 P.2d 560, 561 (1956);
State v. Sills, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 349, 352-53, 199 A.2d 186, 187 (Ct. App. 1963);
People v. Hasto, 236 App. Div. 533, 534-35, 260 N.Y.S. 97, 99-100 (1932); State
v. McCord, 258 S.C. 163, 167, 187 S.E.2d 654, 656 (1972). But see Rice v. State,
240 Ark. 674, 678, 401 S.W.2d 562, 564 (1966).
127. United States v. Frazier, 444 F.2d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 1971); People v.
Rush, 172 Cal. App. 2d 431, 436-38, 341 P.2d 788, 791-92 (1959); Nora v. People,
-Colo.,
491 P.2d 62, 64 (1971) (dictum); People v. Coats, 16 Mich. App.
652, 654-55, 168 N.W.2d 463, 465 (1969); Reeves v. State, 428 S.W.2d 320, 523
(Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
128. Evidence of a disclosure to the payee that the account is insufficient has
been held admissible on the issue of intent even though a fraudulent purpose
to pay accompanied the disclosure. State v. Zent, 92 Ariz. 334, 336-37, 376 P.2d
861, 863 (1962); People v. Jacobson, 248 Mich. 639, 64243, 227 N.W. 781, 782
(1929); State v. Creachbaum, 24 Ohio App. 2d 31, 37-39, 263 N.E.2d 675, 679
(1970); State v. Vice, 33 Ohio Op. 544, 545, 70 N.E.2d 125, 127 (Ct. C.P. 1946).
129. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 190.15 (1) (McKinney 1967).
130. State v. Nelson, 58 S.D. 562, 567, 237 N.W. 766, 768 (1931); Miller v.
State, 166 Tex. Crim. 613, 613-14, 317 S.W.2d 542, 543 (1958); State v. Cunningham, 90 W. Va. 806, 809-10, 111 S.E. 835, 837 (1922).
131. Not all courts will allow such evidence. See People v. Privitier, 200 Cal.
App. 2d 725, 729, 19 Cal. Rptr. 640, 643 (1962).

132. Maki v. State, 239 Md. 311, 314, 211 A.2d 711, 712-13 (1965).
133. Compare State v. Johnson
Iowa., 196 N.W.2d 563, 570-71 (1972),
and Cook v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 251, 259-60, 16 S.E.2d 635, 638 (1941), with
State v. Spitko, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 99, 104, 195 A.2d 577, 578 (App. Div. 1963), and
Haines v. State, 135 Neb. 433, 439-40, 281 N.W. 860, 864 (1938).
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can make an arrangement for payment of the check or restoration of the
goods.' 3 4
Each element of the crime supplies the basis for a defense. For instance, the defendant may succeed in proving that he and the payee
135
actually treated an instrument as a promissory note and not as a check;
that there were sufficient funds at the passing of the check and for some
136 or that the
time thereafter, but the presentation was unduly late;
137

defendant had sufficient "credit" at the time of issuance.

C. Constitutionality of Insufficient Funds Statutes
Because making good on the check is either explicitly or practically
a defense or at least a mitigating circumstance under nearly every insufficient funds statute, such statutes have constantly been vulnerable to
constitutional attack on the ground that they allow imprisonment for
debt. 138 The basic counterargument is that the statute punishes intent to
defraud, not the failure to pay a debt.139 It has been argued, however,
that this must be a specific intent (which it is in most statutes), not a
general criminal intent, because the criminal act always "grows out"
of a debt.' 40
There is also a due process argument with respect to the prima
facie evidence sections. The courts, however, have nearly always upheld
the prima facie proof sections. They say that these sections merely allow
the prosecution to get to the jury on the issues covered in the given section;
but they do not raise a presumption of guilt. The constitutionality of
such a provision must rest on one of two theories: rational relationship or
comparative convenience.' 4 ' The United States Supreme Court prefers
the rule that there must be a natural and rational relation between the
fact proved and the fact presumed.1 42 However, few state courts have directly met the issue of the application of the rational relationship rule to
134. It is the practice in some prosecutors' offices to discourage prosecution
before notice of dishonor is sent, if there is a strong possibility that the victim
will be restored to the status quo.
135. Gibbs v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.2d 583, 584-85 (Ky. 1954); Jackson
v. State, 251 Miss. 529, 532, 170 So. 2d 438, 439 (1965); see text accompanying note
21 supra.
136. Edwards v. State, -. Miss..__ 217 So. 2d 14, 16 (1968); Arnwine v.
State, 167 Tex. Crim. 386, 389-90, 320 S.W.2d 353, 355 (1959).
137. See text accompanying note 73 supra. An arrangement with the bank
for credit is difficult to prove without a written agreement. See State v. DeVinney,
98 Ariz. 273, 277, 403 P.2d 921, 923 (1965); Kaufman v. State, 199 Md. 35, 40, 85
A.2d 446, 448 (1952) ; People v. Cimini, 33 Mich. App. 461, 463-64, 190 N.W.2d
323, 324 (1971).
138. See Annot., 23 A.L.R. 459 (1923). But the court will not always take
jurisdiction over the constitutional issue. Christ v. State, 480 S.W.2d 394, 397
(Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
139. State v. Yarboro, 194 N.C. 498, 501-03, 140 S.E. 216, 219 (1927); Colin
v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 371, 373, 168 S.W.2d 500, 501 (1943).
140. State v. Yarboro, 194 N.C. 498, 513, 140 S.E. 216, 224 (1927) (dissenting
opinion).
141. Smithson v. State, 222 Tenn. 499, 508-10, 438 S.W.2d 61, 65 (1969);
1 F. WHARTON, CrmnNAL EvmEN cE § 94 (13th ed. C. Torcia 1972).
142. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969); Tot v. United States, 319
U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943). See also United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965);
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965); Abrams, Statutory Presumptions and
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/6
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the prima fade evidence sections of insufficient funds statutes.1 48 Those

who believe that the issuance of an insufficient funds check should not be
a criminal offense argue that there is no rational relationship between
the proved facts of making the check, refusal of payment, and failure to
make good, and the presumed facts of knowledge of insufficiency and intent to defraud at the time of the making. The doctrine of comparative
convenience, on the other hand, holds that where the defendant has more
convenient access than the state to the fact inferred and where requiring
the defendant to bear the risk of nonproduction does not subject him
to unfairness or hardship, the state's proof of certain facts should allow
the inference of others. As with the rational relationship test, the successful

application of the comparative convenience standard to a prima fade
evidence section is certainly arguable. A defendant could well claim that
the role is patently unfair to him and, therefore, unconstitutional. The
resolution of this dilemma would depend upon the court's characterization
of "unfairness" and hardship with respect to the prima facie evidence
section in question. 144
Successful constitutional arguments against an insufficient funds
statute were made in People v. Vinnola.145 That case struck down Colorado's statute 146 as being a denial of due process and of equal protection.
The Colorado Supreme Court looked first to the many changes in the
statute and said that these indicated some confusion as to the legislative
intent.147 More specifically, with respect to the element of knowledge of
insufficiency the court focused on the language "knowing or having reasonable cause to know ... ." The court said that the "reasonable cause"
language was vague.' 48 The court then said that the statute's definition
of "insufficient funds" ("no legal right to require the drawee to pay the
check in accordance with the ordinary course of banking business") was
equally vague. 149 Next, the court struck the prima fade evidence section,
which required presentment within 30 days of issuance and dishonor to
establish its prima fade effect. The statute also provided, as a defense,
that the maker or a person acting for him could make restitution. The court
regarded this formulation as nothing more than a debt-collecting device
that dangled imprisonment precariously above the maker's head, forcing
the Federal Criminal Law: A Suggested Analysis, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1135 (1969);
Brown, The Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 34 U. CI.
L. Rzv. 141 (1966); Note, Statutory Criminal Presumptions; Judicial Sleight of
Hand, 53 VA. L. Rriv. 702 (1967).
143. See Smithson v. State, 222 Tenn. 499, 508-10, 438 S.W.2d 61, 65 (1969).
144. Other constitutional arguments have been levelled at totalling provisions.
See Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815, 818-19 (Alas. 1968); Siegel v. Commonwealth,
176 Ky. 772, 777-79, 197 S.W. 467, 468 (1917); State v. Ferris, 80 N.M. 663, 665-67,
459 P.2d 462, 464-65 (Ct. App. 1969).
145 -Colo., 494 P.2d 826 (1972).
146. The statute under attack was COLo. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 40-5-205 (Supp.
1971). The repeal of this statute caused its predecessor to come back into effect,
CoLo. Rrv. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-20 (1963). Prosecutions under this older law ignited
new attacks on appeal. See White v. District Court, -Colo.., 503 P.2d 840
(1972).
147. __-Colo. at., 494 P.2d at 829.
148. Id at _, 494 P.2d at 830.
149. Id. at _, 494 P.2d at 831.
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150
The
him to pay a debt against which he may have had a legal defense.
the
defect,
worst
the
statute's
it
considered
what
on
court then focussed
fact that criminal liability was dependent to too great an extent on the
"unfettered discretion" of third parties because the payee's presentment,
the bank's dishonor, and restitution by a third party were all conditions
over which the maker had no direct control. 151 Finally, Vinola summarized
the statute's lack of clarity and resulting unfairness by pointing to the
possibility of inconsistent conclusions that result from an inquiry into
whether the penalty is imposed "for issuing the bad check, for failure to
make satisfaction of the check, or for not being able to cover the check

when presented ....",152
Whether Vinnola represents a growing trend toward the overturning
of insufficient funds statutes or merely a specific attack on a particularly
vulnerable one remains to be seen. Certainly, any statute of this type can
be characterized as a debt-collecting law because there will seldom be a
prosecution if the parties to the check have reached an agreement as to
restitution. Reliance on third party action for the proof of guilt is also
unavoidable because the payee does not know, at issuance, that the check
is bad, and the bank can only dishonor upon presentment. However,
almost every criminal offense bases prosecution on the acts of a person
other than the defendant himself, because if the victim fails to make a
complaint or the complainant seeks to drop charges, prosecution can
seldom be successful. In this regard, however, Vinnola criticizes the unfettered discretion of third parties, not the allowance of some discretion.
Thus, perhaps the constitutional validity of reliance upon third party
discretion depends upon the degree of such reliance, not upon the mere
fact of some reliance.
One safeguard for an insufficient funds statute is a severability provision that maintains the constitutionality of the whole, if a part is stricken;
153
this assumes, of course, that the crime's essential elements remain.
Moreover, the severity and ingenuity of the constitutional arguments
against these statutes may be disguised indicators of hostility towards
viewing insufficient funds checks as criminal in nature.
D. Deceptive Practicesand Civil Remedy Statutes
Not all states follow the standard approach of providing a criminal
penalty for writing an insufficient funds check. Some jurisdictions maintain
the criminal offense, but couch it in terms of a broadly stated deceptive
practices statute. 154 Vermont, on the other hand, uses the normal language
155
to describe the wrongful act, but provides for only a civil remedy.
The current deceptive practices statutes require both a specific intent
494 P.2d at 832.
150. Id. at
151. Id. at ., 494 P.2d at 831-32.
152. Id. at ., 494 P.2d at 832.
.

153.

CAL. PENaAL CODE tit.

97-19-1 (1972).
154. ILL. REv.

13, § 476a (e) (West 1970); Miss.

CoDE ANN.

§

STAT. ch. 38, § 17-1 (1969); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3030 to -3040
(Supp. IV, part 2. 1972); Oa. Rm. STAT. § 164.085 (1971); Ky. PENAL CODE §

1515 (Final Draft, 1971).

155.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,§

2311 (Supp. 9, 1972).
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to defraud and the obtaining of money or property. 158 Accepted formulations impose liability for "creating or reinforcing a false impression as to
law, value, or other state of mind"' 5 7 or for "promis[ing] a performance
which the actor does not intend to perform or knows will not be performed;" in this latter formulation, no inference is to be drawn from the
failure to perform the promise. 1 58 Because this last qualification would
seem to make an insufficient funds offense virtually impossible to prove,
prima fade evidence sections are inserted specifically to deal with that
offense. But there is also an implicit defense through the addition of a
provision removing from "deception" any representation "not likely to
deceive an ordinary person in the group addressed."' 159 Because only one
deceptive practices statute has been in existence for any significant period
of time,1 6 0 it is difficult to determine how many of the insufficient funds
issues this approach resolves. If nothing else, such statutes achieve brevity
by including several crimes within a concise formulation.
Vermont is the only state without a criminal remedy for the issuance
of an insufficient funds check. This reflects the attitude that the offense
is at best quasi-criminal and, if the actor can be reached at all, restitution
should end the process.' 86 Sections 2311 and 2312 of title nine, Vermont
Statutes Annotated (1972), describe a normal insufficient funds offense
minus intent to defraud. The penalty is the amount of the ched with
interest, the cost of collection, and attorney's fees. 162 This civil statute
allows for a variety of defenses unknown to the criminal statutes. For
example, estoppel is applicable where there is an agreement not to resort
to the statutory remedy; of course, no one can waive the operation of
criminal statutes.63 Studies show that no greater percentage of bad checks
04
are passed in Vermont than in other states of comparable makeup.
E. Malicious Prosecution
Insufficient funds statutes lend themselves to use by anxious creditors
who seek only payment on the check and not a criminal remedy. To avoid
a deluge of such creditors upon their offices, prosecutors seek to insure
156. See generally People v. Stewart, 3 Ill. App. 3d 699, 279 N.E.2d 53 (1971);
People v. Tenen, 132 IMI. App. 2d 786, 788, 270 N.E.2d 179, 180 (1971); People
v. Greene, 92 Ill. App. 2d 201, 206, 235 N.E.2d 295 (1968); People v. Samples,
80 Ill. App. 2d 182, 186, 224 N.E.2d 284, 286 (1967); Ferrell v. State, 219 N.E.2d
804, 806 (Ind. 1966).
157. Omr. REv. STAT. § 164.085 (1) (a) (1971); Ky. PENAL CODE § 1515 (1) (a)

(Final Draft, 1971).
158. IND. Am. STAT. § 10-3040 (3) (f) (Supp. IV, part 2, 1972).
159. ORE. Rv. STAT. § 164.085 (3) (1971); Ky. PENAL CODE § 1515 (3) (Final
Draft, 1971).
160. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3030 to -3040 (Supp. IV, part 2, 1972).
161. The VT. PROP. CRnw. CODE tit. 13, § 2006 (1970), specifies a criminal

sanction for the insufficient funds violation, but the legislature of that state has
yet to enact this provision into law.
162. Body attachment is also provided as a statutory remedy, but the statute's
legislative history casts doubt as to the current applicability of this remedy. See
generally Nunn v. Smith, 270 N.C. 374, 154 S.E.2d 497 (1967).
163. Neverett v. Towne, 121 Vt. 447, 457-58, 159 A.2d 345, 351-52 (1960),
af'd, 123 Vt. 45, 55, 179 A.2d 583, 589-90 (1962).
164. F. BE=Tr,

Sosmm PoTENAIrms oF EXPERmNTAL JuRISPRUDENCE AS A

Nrnw BRa_'cH OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 356 (1957).
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that once they have initiated criminal prosecution, the complainant will
not drop charges if he later gets restitution from the maker or drawer
of the check. Similarly, the innocent drawer who may be wrongfully
harassed by impending prosecution has the remedy of malicious prosecution against the payee or holder.165
The roles of the parties in a malicious prosecution action are reversed: the maker or drawer is the plaintiff and the victim in the criminal
action becomes the defendant. The drawer, as plaintiff, must usually show
that there was no probable cause 166 for the initiation of the criminal
proceeding and that there was a termination of that proceeding in his
favor.' 7 A nolle prosequi is such a favorable termination. 168 If the drawer
makes any payment on the check, however, he has made a tacit admission
that there was probable cause for the institution of the proceedings.' 69
Moreover, the standard for probable cause is less stringent in a malicious
prosecution action than in a criminal proceeding. The test is stated in
terms of knowledge of such facts and circumstances as would induce in
the mind of a reasonable man, not a well-educated lawyer, the conclusion
of the drawer's possible guilt.170 Several statutes expressly state that
probable cause, taken in a legal sense, will be a defense to any civil action
for false arrest or malicious prosecution.' 7 ' Other states presume the
existence of probable cause if the payee himself sends notice of dishonor
by registered mail and waits the prescribed period before filing the complaint.17 2 Another approach to the probable cause question is to allow
prima facie evidence of the bad check crime to operate as a defense to a
civil action.'7 3 Finally, one jurisdiction permits proof of collateral agreements to show the lack of probable cause only if the collateral agreement
174
appears on the check.
Some states try to discourage the filing of frivolous criminal complaints by punishing as a misdemeanor any action taken by a payee or
holder when he had knowledge of either insufficiency of funds or postdating,17 5 or when he requests dismissal of the proceedings.' 7 6 Coverage
of this latter situation is an attempt to maintain the integrity of the
criminal proceeding by ruling out restitution as a reason to drop the
charge. Another method to prevent the filing of half-hearted and malicious
complaints is to assess all costs of the proceeding to a complainant who is
165. Kitchens v. Barlow, 250 Miss. 121, 134, 164 So. 2d 745, 751-52 (1964).
166. But cf. Bell v. Capital Bakers, Inc., 88 Dauphine County R. 203, 207
(Pa. Ct. App. 1967).
167. See Warner, Bad Checks, 37 Miss. L.J. 86, 100 (1965).
168. White v. Coleman, 277 F. Supp. 292, 297 (D.S.C. 1967).
169. Marchbanks v. Young, 47 N.M. 213, 216, 139 P.2d 594, 596 (1943).
170. White v. Coleman, 277 F. Supp. 292, 297 (D.S.C. 1967).

171.

GA. CODE ANN.

175.

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 26-1704(c) (1972).

172. Id.; S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-177 (Supp. I, 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-118
(1973).
173. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-19-1 (1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1967 (Supp. 7,
1967). Courts may narrowly read the statutory exemption from civil liability.
Johnson v. Zale Corp., 484 S.W.2d 531, 534 (Tenn. 1972).
174. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-118 (1973).

§ 21-3709 (Supp. II, 1972).

176. Txx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 567 (b), § 6 (Supp. 1A, 1972). This applies
to the informant who institutes the proceedings and to a witness.
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found at the criminal trial not to have had reasonable cause to believe
that there were insufficient funds177 or who seeks a dismissal of the
178
proceedings.
III.

Missoumi LAw

Missouri insufficient funds statutes have maintained the same elements
and language, except in one respect, since 1917.179 The original statute
made the mere passing of an insufficient funds check with the intent to
defraud a criminal act. A 1925 amendment introduced the requirement
that the maker receive consideration, thus manifesting a clear legislative
intent to bring the Missouri statute closer to the traditional false pretenses formulation. 8 0 The only other alterations since 1917 have been
minor.' 8 1
The current Missouri insufficient funds statute, section 561.460,
RSMo 1973 Supp., reads:
Any person who, to procure any article or thing of value or for
the payment of any past due debt or other obligation of whatsoever form or nature or who, for any other purpose, shall make
or draw or utter or deliver, with intent to defraud, any check, draft
or order, for the payment of money, upon any bank or other depositary, knowing at the time of such making, drawing, uttering
or delivering, that the maker or drawer has not sufficient funds
in or credit with such bank or other depositary for the payment
of such check, draft, or order, in full, upon its presentation, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor ....
The language "for any other purpose" has caused some confusion. 82
This language may indicate an intent to establish a very broad spectrum
of types of consideration. The inclusion of "past due debts" substantiates
this interpretation, because few jurisdictions include them. 88
Case law clearly treats the Missouri statute as a branch of false
pretenses.' 8 4 This is evident from the courts' reference to the issuance of
177. FA.
178.

STAT. ANN. § 832.05 (6)
ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 234 (21)

(1965).
(Supp. 5, 1971); N.M.

STAT.

ANN. § 40-49-9

(1972). To guard the bank against civil actions for divulging information about

the drawer's account to the prosecutor, at least one state specifically exempts the
bank. COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-5-205 (11) (Supp. 1973).
179. Missouri's insufficient funds statutes since 1917 are as follows: §§ 561.460.
.480, RSMo 1969; §§ 561.460-.080, RSMo 1959; §§ 561.460-.480, RSMo 1949; §§
4695-97, RSMo 1939; §§ 4505.07, RSMo 1929; §§ 3553-55, RSMo 1919.
180. See statute quoted note 3 supra.
181. In 1963, the Missouri legislature made the writing of bad checks over
$100 felony offenses and the writing of bad checks under that amount mis.
demeanors. Another minor amendment occurred in the prima facie evidence
section, where the legislature increased the amount of time after notice of dishonor
in which the actor can rebut the inference was from 5 to 10 days. See statute
quoted note 36 supra.
182. State v. Phillips, 430 S.W.2d 635, 637 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
183. Past due debts have not always been viewed as consideration in Missouri.
State v. Hack, 284 S.W. 842 (St. L. Mo. App. 1926). See generally State v. Benson,
110 Mo. 18, 19 S.W. 213 (1892); State v. Willard, 109 Mo. 242, 19 S.W. 189 (1892);
State v. Clay, 100 Mo. 571, 13 S.W. 827 (1890).
184. State v. Kleen, 491 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Mo. 1973) (dictum); State v. Garner,
432 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Mo. 1968); State v. Bafty, 494 S.W.2d 425, 425 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1973).
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the check as a misrepresentation of a present fact.18 5 This treatment may
open up insufficient funds prosecutions to false pretenses defenses.' 86
Intent to defraud is an element in Missouri's insufficient funds
statute, and proof of such intent can be by circumstantial evidence' 8 7
as well as by use of the prima fade evidence section. 8 8 In either case, the
relevant intent is that existing at the time of issuance of the check.' 8 9
Allowing proof of intent by circumstantial evidence prevents the abuse
of withdrawing funds after issuance and covers the situation where there
are other outstanding checks at the date of issuance. The statute fails to
reach either of these areas. There is old precedent to the effect that mere
presentment and dishonor suffice to show intent,190 but this approach
would be inapplicable today. A frequently used way to prove intent is
to show the commission of "similar offenses." The test for the admissibility
of such evidence is whether at the time of issuance of the check under
consideration the other checks constituted sufficiently similar offenses to
shed light on the intent issue.' 91 In making this determination, a prime
factor is the proximity in time between the check under consideration and
the others' 9 2 (fourteen months has been held to be too long an interval). 9 3
Another area of controversy deals with post-dated checks, along with
no-date checks.' 9 4 A 1934 Missouri case reasons that because post-dated
checks were not expressly excepted by the statute, the statute must cover
them. 19 5 The court in this case said that the language "shall be guilty"
gave the statute an element of futurity, thereby negating the position
that a post-dated check was not criminal. Further bolstering its argument,
the court said that the Negotiable Instruments Law's definition of "check"

made no reference to the date on the check.' 9 6 Despite the ingenuity of
these points, the present Missouri law strongly resists applying criminal

185. State v. DeClue, 400 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. 1966) (no funds case); State
v. Griggs, 361 Mo. 758, 763, 236 S.W.2d 588, 590 (1951) (no funds case). These
cases involve prosecutions under section 561.450, RSMo 1973 Supp., which is
aimed at, among other offenses, checks written on banks in which the actor has
no funds. The reasoning in these cases is closely analogous to that in insufficient
funds cases.
186. One such defense is the victim's failure to avail himself of the means at
hand to determine the falsity of the representation. State v. Herman, 162 S.W.2d
873, 874 (Mo. 1942) (false pretenses case).
187. State v. Brookshire, 329 S.W.2d 252, 256 (St. L. Mo. App.), on remand
from 325 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. 1959).
188. § 561.470, RSMo 1973 Supp; see statute quoted note 36 supra.
189. State v. DeClue, 400 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Mo. 1966) (no funds case) (dictum).
190. State v. Moss, 94 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Spr. Mo. App. 1936).
191. Checks that are returned uncollected funds do not constitute similar
offenses for this purpose. State v. Klosterman, 471 S.W.2d 175, 177-78 (Mo. 1971).
See also State v. DeClue, 400 S.W.2d 50, 55 (Mo. 1966) (no funds case).
192. State v. Klosterman, 471 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Mo. 1971).
193. State v. Stegall, 353 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo. 1962) (false pretenses case).
194. See State v. Humphrey, 74 S.W.2d 86, 87 (Spr. Mo. App. 1934) (no date
check).
195. State v. Taylor, 335 Mo. 460, 468, 73 S.W.2d 378, 382 (En Banc 1934).
196. Id. at 469-70, 73 S.W.2d at 383.
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sanctions to the makers of post-dated or undated checks, 19 7 even in the
presence of circumstances that indicate fraudulent intent.198
Other factors besides post-dating that the actor can use to combat the
state's evidence on intent are the bank's custom of allowing overdrafts, 100
a later agreement with the victim to settle the problem, 200 and the fact
that the defendant was writing for a corporation and so informed the
2 01
victim.

Missouri employs a standard prima fade evidence section 202 and
follows the general rule that such evidence creates a rebuttable inference
of fact, not an irrebuttable presumption of law.2 03 The section requires
notice of dishonor, but does not specify who should send it. There is
sufficient notice, however, if the bank sends a letter to the actor's last
known address. 204 There is no directive as to what constitutes prima facie
evidence of presentment and dishonor, but the bank's notation on the
check will not alone suffice as proof of presentment in the ordinary course
of business.2 05 Probably, testimony from a bank official is necessary. If
the provisions of the prima fade evidence section are met, the inference
thus created goes to both the intent to defraud and knowledge of in2 06
sufficiency at issuance.
The phrase "not sufficient funds in or credit with" has been a source
of considerable litigation in Missouri. For instance, close adherence to
the statutory language is a requirement, because failure to allege insufficient credit2 07 in the information can render it fatally defective.2 08 Of
greater significance is the problem that exists in Missouri as to the point

in time when sufficiency is determined. The accepted judicial view is
197. This is the rule whether or not attention was called to the post-dating.
It is also the rule where there was an agreement to hold the check before cashing
it. State v. Young, 226 Mo. 723, 733, 183 S.W. 805, 308 (1916) (no funds case);
State v. Phillips, 430 S.W.2d 635, 637 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
198. State v. Brookshire, 329 S.W.2d 252, 256 (St. L. Mo. App.), on remand
from 825 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. 1959). See also State v. Benson, 110 Mo. 18, 19 S.W.
218 (1892).
199. State v. Felman, 50 S.W.2d 683, 684 (St. L. Mo. App. 1932).
200. State v. Mullins, 292 Mo. 44, 52, 237 S.W. 502, 504 (1922).
201. State v. Kaufman, 308 S.W.2d 883, 337 (St. L. Mo. App. 1957) (by implication).
202. § 561.470, RSMo 1978 Supp.; see statute quoted note 86 supra.
203. State v. Phillips, 480 S.W.2d 635, 687 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
204. State v. Euge, 359 S.W.2d 369, 875 (St. L. Mo. App.), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 960 (1962), rehearingdenied, 878 U.S. 954 (1963).
205. State v. Scott, 280 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Mo. 1950).
206. Of course, the defendant can counter this inference with evidence of a
previous arrangement with the bank to pay an overdraft or restitution after notice
of dishonor. State v. Morris, 470 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Mo. 1971); State v. Kaufman,
308 S.W.2d 833, 339 (St. L. Mo. App. 1957). But he must be able to substantiate
these claims to effectively halt the operation of the prima fade evidence section.
207. State v. Friedman, 398 S.W.2d 37, 40 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965) (no funds
case).
208. State v. Forsythe, 406 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Mo. 1966). However, the State
can make a timely amendment. State v. Morris, 470 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Mo. 1971).
But cf. State v. Euge, 359 S.W.2d 869, 371 (St. L. Mo. App.), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
960, (1962), rehearing denied, 373 U.S. 954 (1963).
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that the test of sufficiency is at presentation. 2 09 Obviously, this test represents an attempt to bring within the statute's coverage the problems of
subsequent withdrawals and other outstanding checks. Although this approach seems reasonable in that the victim will file no complaint if the
check is honored at presentation, it seemingly runs afoul of the concept
that the relevant knowledge of insufficiency, as well as the relevant intent
to defraud, is that existing at issuance. The statute refers to "knowing
at the time of such making . .. that the maker or drawer has not sufficient funds . . . ." Moreover, under false pretenses rationale, 210 issuing
the check should be a misrepresentation of a present fact (i.e., insufficiency
at issuance). The prima facie evidence section glosses over the timing
dilemma. Some prosecutors, however, hesitate to use judicial test, and
apply the statutory and false pretenses reasoning by refusing to initiate a
21 1
proceeding unless there were insufficient funds on the date of issuance.
This variance between the judicial and prosecutorial views shows that
the Missouri statute's capacity to reach the situations involving subsequent
withdrawals and other outstanding checks is tenuous at best.
The defendant has several opportunities to prevail on the insufficiency issue. One is to show an arrangement with the bank or a bank
policy that allows overdrafts.212 Another possibility is to show that there
were deductions from the account without defendant's knowledge. The
defendant, however, has constructive knowledge of any permissible bank
charges that deplete the account. 218 The argument that there were other
accounts in the bank that could cover the check probably will not succeed;
one case reads into the statute the language that there must be insufficient funds in the account "which can be reached by that check." 2 14 A
savings account in the same bank that contained sufficient funds would,
therefore, be no defense at all.215
No case defines an extensive constitutional justification for the existing insufficient funds statute in Missouri. One case takes the standard
approach that the statute does not allow imprisonment for debt because
it is the fraud that is punished and not the failure to fulfill a "future
promise." 21 6 An older rationale views bad check writing as a public
nuisance, thus placing control of the activity within the legal exercise
of the state's police power despite the existence of a civil remedy both on
the instrument and on the underlying obligation. 217 The Missouri statute
209. State v. DeClue, 400 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Mo. 1966)

(no funds case); State

v. Taylor, 335 Mo. 460, 471, 73 S.W.2d 378, 884 (En Banc 1934).
210. See text accompanying note 184 supra.

211. This is the practice in the Circuit Attorney's Office of the city of St.
Louis, Missouri.
212. State v. Felman, 50 S.W.2d 683, 684

(St. L. Mo. App. 1932); cf. text

accompanying note 199 supra. But the mere fact of an overdraft will seldom be
sufficient to prove the existence of an arrangement. State v. Kaufman, 308 S.W.2d
333, 339 (St. L. Mo. App. 1957).
213. Hulett v. State, 468 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Mo. 1971).

214. State v. Klosterman, 471 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Mo. 1971).
215. State v. Euge, 359 S.W.2d 369 (St. L. Mo. App.), cert. denied, 372 U.S.

960 (1962), rehearing denied, 373 U.S. 954 (1963).

216. State v. Brookshire, 329 S.W.2d 252, 256 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959).
217. State v. Taylor, 335 Mo. 460, 465, 73 S.W.2d 378, 380 (En Banc 1934).
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seems less susceptible than the Colorado statute in Vinnola1 8 to the
"vague" and "unfettered-discretion-of-third parties" arguments that the
court accepted in that case. Case law well defines the statutory language,
and the defendant's actions, not those of third parties, invoke the prima
fade evidence section.
IV.

PROPOSALS FOR A MORE FFFECr1VE INSUFFICIENT FUNDS STATUTE

There is considerable controversy on the question whether the writing
of an insufficient funds check should even be a criminal offense. Those
in favor of the criminal sanction point to the deterrent effect of a criminal
statute and the need for the protection of the negotiability of checks;
those opposed argue that an adequate civil remedy exists, that the prosecutor has become a debt-collecting agent, and that merchants are careless
in accepting checks because there is a criminal sanction. 219 Apparently, a
vast majority of the states believe that a criminal remedy does serve a worthwhile purpose.2 20 There are improvements, however, that would make
the statutes more workable while lessening the burden on the prosecutor.
For example, the statute should include within its purview one who
"passes" a bad check (an indorser).2 2 1 Under most current formulations,
the passer is only implicitly covered. Another example is the inclusion of
subsequent withdrawals as a part of the criminal act. Without this inclusion, many jurisdictions have no sanction for subsequent withdrawals
because there has been no misrepresentation of present fact.
A more provocative area for improvement is the intent to defraud
element. Several of the new proposed codes avoid the problem of determin-

ing whether the relevant intent to defraud is at issuance or presentment

by making either presentment 22 2 or dishonor2 28 express, not tacit, elements. The timing difficulty would be partially resolved in that intent

at issuance and insufficiency at presentation would, on the face of the
statute, be separate requirements; no need would exist to stretch the
scienter over the period of time between issuance and presentment. While
this approach could subject the statute to Vinnota's "unfettered-discretionof-third parties" argument because presentation is in the control of a third
party, public policy might dictate a denial of such an attack. Also, this
clarification would more readily cover the problem of "subsequent withdrawals."

A further problem under the intent element is the mechanical working of the prima fade evidence section, which is nearly always at the heart
of an insufficient funds prosecution. Two proposals are appropriate; both
would ease the prosecutor's burden while maintaining the statute's effectiveness. First, the statute should specify that the victim (i.e., the defrauded party) or the drawee bank must send notice of dishonor by reg218. See text accompanying notes 148-151 supra.
219. F.

BEUTEL, SoME POTENTIALITIES OF EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AS A

Nnw BRANCH OF SocrAl ScrENCE 852-53 (1957); Missouri Commission to Draft a
Modem Criminal Code, Minutes of Subcommittee Meeting, Sept. 29, 1972.
220. The Vermont experience, however, shows no greater incidence of bad
checks than in any other state. F. BEITEL, supra note 219, at 356.
221. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 190.05 (2) (McKinney 1967).
222. MicH. REv. CRnvr. CODE §§ 4040 (1), (2) (b) (Final Draft, 1967).
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 190.05 (1) (McKinney 1967).
Published223.
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istered mail either to the address on the check or to any address that the

actor gave for official purposes.2 24 Second, the statute should require the
victim to obtain a notice of protest as defined in section 3-509 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and specify that this will serve as prima fade
evidence of presentment, dishonor, and protest. These suggestions would
streamline the procedure, because the prosecutor would become involved
only after some of the preliminary work had been done and at a time
when the victim would be certain that he wants to prosecute. If these requirements were within the statute, they would relieve the prosecutor of
his implied responsibility (i.e., public relations) to handle the notices
of dishonor.
The final problem with regard to intent is that of the post-dated
check. Few current statutes reach this issue.22 5 The simplest approach
would be to remove post-dated checks from the boundaries of the statute,
even though this approach would not mesh either with the policy that
any bad check is a nuisance to the commercial world2 26 or with the fact
that post-dated checks can also be used in fraudulent schemes.
The element of knowledge of insufficient funds or credit needs to be
stated in a straightforward manner. First, knowledge of insufficient funds
should include knowledge of all other outstanding checks that will make
the account insufficient. Second, the definition of the term "credit" should
foreclose any argument based upon an oral or tacit "understanding" by
specifying that a written arrangement is required. The potential incon-

venience that such a requirement might visit upon innocent parties would
be offset by the added difficulty that it would present to a fraudulent
drawer.
Virtually every new or proposed insufficient funds statute removes
the element of consideration and makes the mere issuance of the bad check
the criminal act.227 The basic justification for this is that the mere
writing of a bad check should be a misdemeanor, perhaps having no provision for imprisonment, while actual defrauding should fall under false
pretenses or larceny, with the penalty based on the value obtained by
means of the check. Substantially the same result might be achieved under
a statute like Missouri's, where the check must be written "to procure
anything of value or for the payment of any past due debt ... or for any
other purpose."228 The italicized phrase may well include those situations
that do not encompass actual defrauding through receipt of consideration,
but in which the check enters into commerce nonetheless. Restrictive case
law, however, may limit this language to those areas traditionally covered
by false pretenses.
In any event, if consideration is required, it is wise to include past
due debts as an element of consideration, because the normal case law
224. Txx. PENAL CODE PROP. REVISION § 32.41 (c) (Final Draft, 1970).
225. See text accompanying notes 115-120 supra.
226. MicH. REv. Cant. CODE § 4040, Comment (Final Draft, 1967).
227. N.Y. PENAL. LAw § 190.05 (McKinney 1967); MICH. REv. Cnri.

CODE

§ 4040 (Final Draft, 1967); MONT. PROP. CODE § 94-6-310 (1) (1970); N.J. PENAL
CODE § 2c:21-5 (Final Draft, 1971); TEx. PENAL CODE PROP. REVISION § 32.41 (a)
(Final Draft, 1970).
228. § 561.460, RSMo 1973 Supp. (emphasis added).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/6

28

